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THE REAL COSTS OF NEOLIBERAL EDUCATION





Over the last decade, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
("NCLB" or "the Act") has proven to be a boon to the charter
school industry. The law enabled districts to turn over the re-
sponsibility for running a school to a charter provider if that
school has gone five years without consistently raising the test
scores of students in any one subgroup or demographic category
for which there are more than forty students.1 The student sub-
groups governed by this legislation include, among others, those
with special needs, English language learners, low-income stu-
dents, and students of a particular racial minority.2 Many dis-
tricts across the country have availed themselves of the charter
conversion option, which the law intended as a sanction that
would compel struggling schools to improve.' No additional sup-
port or resources were provided to these struggling schools under
the law. Instead, in the years leading up to the possible charter
school conversion or takeover, the school was subject to other
costly and potentially disruptive penalties such as providing and
paying for supplemental remedial tutoring, implementing a new
• Associate Professor of Education, Villanova University.
•* Graduate Student, School Counseling Program, Villanova University.
The authors gratefully acknowledge Jason Hodge and Joseph Szesko for their tech-
nical assistance and Neil Horgan for sharing his expertise.
1. See NAOMI CHUDOWSKY & VICTOR CHUDOWSKY, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY,
IDENTIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE
No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 5 (2005); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of The No
Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 943 (2004).
2. See Ryan, supra note 1, at 933.
3. See id. at 934, 943.
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curriculum, losing its principal, or replacing at least 50% of its
teachers.'
Other policy developments have also proven beneficial to char-
ter schools. States were encouraged through the 2009 Race to the
Top program to lift charter school enrollment caps and to make it
easier for high-performing charter schools to expand.5 Additional-
ly, even when NCLB waivers were first offered to states in 2011,6
the advantaged position of charter schools in the educational
landscape did not change. In order to qualify for a waiver, states
were required to commit to turning around the lowest-achieving
5% of their Title I schools, using strategies such as outright clo-
sure or conversion to a charter.7
Given these federal policies, it comes as no surprise that over
the last decade the number of charter schools in the country has
grown exponentially. The annual growth rate in student enroll-
ment in this sector over the last five years has averaged 12%, and
charter schools are on track to serve 20-40% of the nation's stu-
dents by 2035.8 In three of the five largest cities in the United
States, charter schools serve more than 20% of the student popu-
lations,9 and in New Orleans and Detroit, they have become the
largest provider of public education.10
Charter schools are often considered an innovation, insofar as
they disrupt current governance models and education delivery
4. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6316(b)(7)(C), (b)(S)(B)(ii) (2012).
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-3,
11 (2009) (detailing incentives for charter school expansion).
6. Alyson Klein, NCLB Waivers: The Twists, Turns, and Terms to Know, EDUC. WK.
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.edweek.orglew/section/multimedia/nclb-waivers-timeline-and-
glossary-of-terms.html.
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B); Alyson Klein, No Child Left Behind: An Overview,
EDUC. WK. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/no-child-left-be
hind-overview-definition-summary.html; Michele McNeil & Alyson Klein, Obama Offers
Waivers from Key Provisions of NCLB, EDUC. WK. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.edweek.
orglew/articles/2 011/09/28/05waiver ep.h31.html.
8. See SARA MEAD ET AL., BELLWETHER EDUC. PARTNERS, THE STATE OF THE
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 9, 60 (2015), http:/Jbellwethereducation.org/sites/default/
files/Charter%20Research%200908%2OFINAL.pdf; Sarah Mead, Charter Schools Are Here
to Stay, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 17, 2015, 3:35 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opin
ion/knowledge-bank/2015/09/17/7-key-facts-about-charter-school-quality.
9. See MEAD ET AL., THE STATE OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT, supra note 8, at
41-42 (indicating that charters serve 30% of the student population in Philadelphia and
21% of the student population in both Los Angeles and Houston).
10. See id. (indicating that charters serve 91% of the student population in New Orle-
ans and 55% of the student population in Detroit).
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approaches. They are frequently framed as a tool that can chal-
lenge the public education monopoly and its bureaucratic bloat,
inject competitive pressures into the marketplace that will serve
to motivate recalcitrant teachers and school leaders, and appeal
directly to parents and students, who will make their preferences
known with their feet.' Though charter schools were envisioned
by those who first introduced the concept as laboratories of inno-
vation that would pioneer new methods of education for tradi-
tionally underserved students and feed those lessons back into
the traditional schools,' few charter schools have lived up to this
ideal either on the front or back end. In fact, the "innovations"
that most of the franchised charter schools use, such as extending
the school day and the school year, are far from revolutionary.
Nonetheless, charter schools have started a revolution by creat-
ing a host of new problems-the most pernicious of which is the
potential dismantlement of public education in this country-
while not necessarily solving the problems they were intended to
address. This article considers how the rise of charter schools in
Philadelphia has further hampered the city school district's ef-
forts to offer a quality education for all students, how it has pre-
cipitated the closure of dozens of neighborhood schools, displacing
thousands of students, and how it continues to portend financial
adversity for the state of public education in the nation's third
poorest city.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces neoliber-
alism as a lens through which the interrelated issues of school
closure and charter school ascendancy can be viewed. Part II out-
lines the financial considerations that factored into the decision
to shutter twenty-four neighborhood schools in Philadelphia in
2013, and contrasts the expected financial outcomes with what
we have been able to piece together about the actual costs, reve-
nues, and cost-savings associated with these closures. Part III
draws out the implications of this calculus not only for Philadel-
phia, but also for other cities in which charter schools are prolif-
11. See Leland Ware & Cara Robinson, Charters, Choice, and Resegregation, 11 DEL.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2009).
12. See Matthew D. Bernstein, Whose Choice Are We Talking About: The Exclusion of
Students with Disabilities from For-Profit Online Charter Schools, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB.
INT. 487, 496 (2013); see also Mark C. Weber, Special Education from the (Damp) Ground
Up: Children with Disabilities in a Charter School-Dependent Educational System, 11
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 217, 218 (2010).
20161
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
erating. This article concludes by arguing that in order for the
democratic ideal of a public school system that serves all children
equitably and effectively to flourish, alternatives to the neoliberal
logic of choice and closure are needed.
I. NEOLIBERALISM
Neoliberalism is a term that is used to describe both particular
policies and a worldview premised on the idea that markets can
solve social problems more efficiently and effectively than can
governmental or public sector agencies. Those who embrace ne-
oliberalism support the unfettered expansion and deregulation of
markets, the application of business principles to knotty social
problems, and a severely curtailed role for government.3 Critical
scholar Pauline Lipman has defined neoliberalism as "an ensem-
ble of economic and social policies, forms of governance, and dis-
courses and ideologies that promote individual self-interest, un-
restricted flows of capital, deep reductions in the cost of labor,
and sharp retrenchment of the public sphere.""
In other words, neoliberalism is a policy approach and a mind-
set, a set of common understandings that legitimatizes a particu-
lar social order and helps define both social ills and their solu-
tions. Neoliberalism privileges market solutions and seeks to
create new competitive markets, while shrinking the role of gov-
ernment. It also serves to restructure both the economy and the
state "in line with individual self-interest and at a cost to com-
mitments to collective well-being."1
Neoliberalism manifests itself through the application of busi-
ness principles and practices such as "bottom line" metrics, "merit
pay" programs, and edu-preneurism to education.6 It is a driving
13. See What Is Neoliberalism?, DAILY KOS (Aug. 16, 2011, 11:50 AM), http://www.
dailykos.com/story/201 /08/16/1007496/-UPDATED-What-is-Neoliberalism#.
14. PAULINE LIPMAN, THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN EDUCATION:
NEOLIBERALISM, RACE, AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 6 (2011). Lipman also notes that
"[n]eoliberals champion privatization of social goods and withdrawal of government from
provision for social welfare on the premise that competitive markets are more effective
and efficient." Id.
15. Wayne Au & Joseph J. Ferrare, Neoliberalism, Social Networks, and the New Gov-
ernance of Education, in MAPPING CORPORATE EDUCATION REFORM: POWER AND POLICY
NETWORKS IN THE NEOLIBERAL STATE 3 (Wayne Au & Joseph J. Ferrare eds., 2015).
16. See LIPMAN, supra note 14, at 46-47 ("Urban schools are wound up in privatiza-
tion public-private partnership, demands for union 'flexibility,' teacher merit pay
schemes, and mayoral takeovers, along with high stakes testing and restricted democra-
[Vol. 50:809
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force behind accountability policies and high-stakes testing. Ne-
oliberal reforms, which are typically justified by poor test scores,
include: mayoral takeovers of school systems where democratical-
ly elected school board members are replaced by mayoral appoin-
tees," development of teacher evaluation systems in which teach-
ers are judged, ranked, and rewarded or punished based on their
contributions to students' test scores,s and efforts to enervate or
vilify teachers unions.9 Other hallmarks of neoliberal education
reform include the rise and expansion of charter schools, the clo-
sure of neighborhood schools, and the outsourcing of key con-
tracts to private companies.
A. Neoliberalism and Charter Schools
In 1990, in a now classic essay titled "Choice Is a Panacea,"
John Chubb and Terry Moe set out a neoliberal vision for K-12
education that called for a dramatically reduced role for state and
local government in education and a deregulated marketplace of
schools: '"What we propose is a new system of public education
that eliminates most political and bureaucratic control over the
schools and relies instead on indirect control through markets
and parental choice.'0 Chubb and Moe contrast the efficiency of
markets with the stagnation caused by democratic control, which
they argue is constrained by bureaucratic pressures and beholden
to unions with little interest in innovation.2' Further, Chubb and
cy."); Au & Ferrare, supra note 15, at 8 (discussing the hallmarks of "corporate education
reform," such as evaluation of students and teachers through competitive metrics and "re-
shaping the vision and vocabulary of public schools along the lines of corporate business-
es").
17. See LIPMAN, supra note 14, at 60 ("Neoliberalism involves governance by appoint-
ed boards, 'experts,' and managers. Mayoral and other forms of state takeover of urban
school systems typify the democratic deficits of neoliberal urban governance, allowing the
state to fast track neoliberal initiatives without the 'interference' of democratic delibera-
tion.").
18. See Au & Ferrare, supra note 15, at 8 (discussing "corporate education reform"
policies and practices such as "evaluation-through-comparison of public education stu-
dents, teachers, administrators, and school communities through competitive metrics as-
sociated with high-stakes, standardized test scores").
19. See, e.g., Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 1, 16 (Aug. 27, 2014) (County of Los
Angeles) (holding that plaintiffs, who were nine California public school students claiming
that the challenged statutes resulted in "grossly ineffective teachers obtaining and retain-
ing permanent employment," met their burden of proof, making the challenged statutes
unconstitutional).
20. John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, America's Public Schools: Choice Is a Panacea, 8
BROOKINGS REV. 4, 5 (1990).
21. See id. at 5-6.
2016]
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Moe suggest that rather than allowing the state to make schools
answerable for student achievement, schools should be held ac-
countable "from below, by parents and students who directly ex-
perience their services and are free to choose."22 Chubb and Moe
trust that "[s]chools that operate in an environment of competi-
tion and choice [will] have strong incentives to move towards the
kinds of 'effective-school' organizations that academics and re-
formers would like to impose on the public schools."3 Emphasiz-
ing the value of school autonomy and the dangers of government
interference and intervention, Chubb and Moe seemingly call for
an educational marketplace composed entirely of independently
run charter schools and private schools.24
Perhaps the best test case of Chubb and Moe's neoliberal vision
of public education has come from New Orleans, a district com-
posed almost entirely of charter schools.2" In a recent research re-
port, Huriya Jabbar writes that in all but one of the thirty ran-
domly selected New Orleans charter schools that she studied,
principals view other schools as competitors.26 The principals un-
derstand competing for students as synonymous with competing
for taxpayer money, as each student would bring additional mon-
ey from local, state, and federal sources.27 Although Chubb and
Moe believe that these competitive pressures will motivate
schools to become better organized and more appealing to par-
ents, Jabbar finds that only one-third of the school leaders re-
sponded to competition by trying to improve academics or instruc-
tion.28 In fact, Jabbar finds that principals in the "failing" schools
were even less likely than those in the "non-failing" schools to fo-
cus on strengthening the academic program and student learn-
ing.2" The most common response to competition reported by New
Orleans charter school leaders in this study was to direct more
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
24. See id. at 5, 7-8.
25. See HURIYA JABBAR, EDUC. RESEARCH ALL. FOR NEW ORLEANS, How Do SCHOOL
LEADERS RESPOND TO COMPETITION? MARKET-BASED COMPETITION AND SCHOOL LEADER
STRATEGIES 3 (2015), http://educationresearchalliancenola.org/files/publications/Tech-Rep
ort-Final-w-cover.pdf.
26. See id. at 11.
27. See id.
28. Compare Chubb & Moe, supra note 20, at 6, with JABBAR, supra note 25, at 12.
29. See JABBAR, supra note 25, at 26.
[Vol. 50:809
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money and resources into marketing efforts, including advertis-
ing campaigns and hiring brand consultants.0
This finding illustrates one of the ways in which neoliberalism
reconfigures public education by creating access to new capital for
entrepreneurs and corporations, such as advertising firms, often
at the expense of students, especially those from low-income
communities. Professors Wayne Au and Joseph Ferrare observe
that "[tlhe shrinking of the neoliberal state, combined with the
neoliberal commitment [to] opening new markets through the ac-
cumulation by dispossession of public assets, has particularly pro-
found implications for public education"'" and serves to "redis-
tribute resources, social and economic goods, wealth, and power
'upwards' towards those individuals, communities, and corpora-
tions already benefiting from high concentrations of wealth."2 Of
course, the charter school entrepreneurs and management organ-
izations are thus among the biggest profiteers in the "new 'gold
rush' to capitalize the $500 billion of public assets being redis-
tributed from neighborhood K-12 public schooling to the market-
place.'33
B. Neoliberalism and School Closure
While educational privatization through the proliferation of
charter schools is one clear manifestation of neoliberal education
reform, a corollary is the closure of public neighborhood schools.
As competitive pressures mount in the marketplace of education,
Chubb and Moe predict that "not all schools in the market will
respond equally well.. . . But those that falter will find it more
difficult to attract support, and they will tend to be weeded out
.... In other words, as charter schools become more effective at
appealing to parents, using the targeted, slick advertising cam-
paigns Jabbar refers to as "glossification,' '3' neighborhood schools,
which do not use taxpayer funds for advertising purposes, will in-
evitably see declines in their enrollments. These declines will ne-
30. See id. at 19, 26-28.
31. Au & Ferrare, supra note 15, at 5.
32. Id. at 4.
33. MICHAEL FABRICANT & MICHELLE FINE, THE CHANGING POLITICS OF EDUCATION:
PRIVATIZATION AND THE DISPOSSESSED LIVES LEFT BEHIND 25 (2013).
34. Chubb & Moe, supra note 20, at 6.
35. Huriya Jabbar, "Every Kid Is Money Market-Like Competition and School Leader
Strategies in New Orleans, 37 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 638, 649 (2015).
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cessitate the "weeding out" or the shuttering of schools. Chubb
and Moe refer to this trend as a "process of natural selection."36
Just as companies that sell an unpopular product need to adapt
to demand or risk going out of business, so too will schools need to
enter the business of catering to students and families, cultivat-
ing demand for their brand of education, or face closure. Under
neoliberalism, students and parents are cast as consumers, and
schools that do not have the resources or tools to compete for the-
se customers risk becoming defunct.
Around the country, school closure has become an increasingly
common strategy to address budget shortfalls and the problems of
underutilized buildings, underperforming schools, and shifting
student enrollments."7 In a review of school closures, law profes-
sor Nicole Stelle Garnett reveals the exponential increase of shut-
tered public schools, which rose from 717 in 2000-01 to 1069 in
the 2010-11 academic year alone.38 Specifically, the Kansas City,
Missouri, School District closed 50% of its public schools in 2010,
New York City closed 164 public schools between 2002 and 2013,
and Chicago closed 104 schools between 2001 and 2011, followed
by an additional forty-nine closures in 2013."9 At the same time,
charter school enrollment in these districts grew dramatically. In
the seven years between the 2005-06 academic year and the
2012-13 academic year, charter enrollments increased 428% in
New York,4° 219% in Chicago,
41 and 46% in Kansas City.42
The Journey for Justice Alliance, a national coalition of grass-
roots community organizing groups, argues that "[tihe real, un-
derlying cause for these school closures is that there has been a
36. Chubb & Moe, supra note 20, at 6.
37. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Disparate Impact, School Closures, and Parental
Choice, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 290, 292 (2014).
38. Id. at 290-91.
39. Id. at 291-92.
40. JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: RACISM, SCHOOL
CLOSURES, AND PUBLIC SCHOOL SABOTAGE 3 (2014), http://www.empowerdc.org/uploads/
J4JReport-Death_by a_ThousandCuts.pdf.
41. Id.
42. See Kansas City, Missouri School District: Total Number of Students, PUB.
CHARTER SCHS. DASHBOARD, http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/students/page
overview/districtlMO-l/year/2014 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (indicating that during the
2005-06 school year, 6428 students were enrolled in charter schools in the Kansas City,
Missouri School District, and that during the 2012-13 school year, 9376 students were en-
rolled in charter schools in the same district).
[Vol. 50:809
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realignment of political forces,"43 both Republican and Democrat,
undergirded by private foundations, that favors steep cuts to edu-
cation, union-busting, and privatization." The data presented in
Journey for Justice's report shows a distinct pattern of skyrocket-
ing charter school enrollments, shrinking neighborhood school
enrollments, and increased reliance on school closure, particular-
ly in districts serving high percentages of students of color.5 In
fact, in 2013, black students made up 87% of those affected by the
closure of forty-nine schools in Chicago, even though they made
up only 43% of the district's population; 94% of those affected
were low-income, even though low-income students comprised
76% of the district's population. Similar disproportionate effects
of school closure on low-income students of color arose in New
York and Philadelphia, where a combined total of forty-five
schools also closed in 2013.47
Other evidence linking school closure, charter school expan-
sion, and the neoliberal education reform agenda comes from
prominent foundations and think tanks seeking to influence and
make education policy. For example, in 2009, the Broad Founda-
tion ("Broad") released a comprehensive guide to school closure,
meant to instruct districts on the effective use of this strategy.8
Not only is Broad eager to support school closure, but it is also
committed to expanding charter schools across the country.9 In
Los Angeles alone, Broad initiated a $490 million plan that aims
to enroll more than half of the city's students in charter schools
within the next eight years."0 Broad is considered a key promulga-
tor of the neoliberal education reform agenda in the United
States.5' Similarly, the Walton Foundation invested $164 million
43. JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra note 40, at 1-2.
44. See id. at 2.
45. See id. at 1-4.
46. You Can't Improve a Closed School: Infographics to Stop Mass School Closures &
Create Real Solutions, NAT'L OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN CAMPAIGN (Feb. 26, 2014), http://
www.otlcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resources/closures-infographic-series.pdf.
47. Id.
48. THE BROAD FOUND., SCHOOL CLOSURE GUIDE: CLOSING SCHOOLS AS A MEANS FOR
ADDRESSING BUDGETARY CHALLENGES 2 (2009), http://www.schoolturnaroundsupport.org/
sites/defaultlfiles/resources/1344-schoolclosureguide.pdf.
49. See Howard Blume, $490-Million Plan Would Put Half of LAUSD Students in
Charter Schools, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/educationla-me
-lausd-charter-20150922-story.html.
50. See id.
51. See Wayne Au & Joseph J. Ferrare, Other People's Policy: Wealthy Elites and
Charter School Reform in Washington State, in MAPPING CORPORATE EDUCATION REFORM:
2016]
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in 2013 alone to support charter school organizations such as the
Knowledge Is Power Program ("KIPP"), and to advocate for par-
ent trigger laws that enable parents to petition to close their
school or convert it to a charter.52
II. THE CASE OF PHILADELPHIA
For decades, the Philadelphia School District ("PSD" or "the
District") has been portrayed as being in a state of crisis.53 Shift-
ing student enrollments, high rates of teacher turnover, and
chronic underfunding by the state have conspired over the years
to destabilize the nation's eighth largest school district.4 Notable
moments in PSD's recent history include the state's 2001 takeo-
ver of the District,55 the 2002 hiring of Paul Vallas as the Dis-
trict's CEO, 6 and the 2009 launch of Imagine 2014, the strategic
plan developed by Vallas's successor, Arlene Ackerman.57 The
state takeover, spurred by low test scores and rising deficits, re-
sulted in the disbanding of the democratically elected school
board and the formation of a new governance structure, a School
Reform Commission ("SRC") consisting of three commissioners
POWER AND POLICY NETWORKS IN THE NEOLIBERAL STATE 147, 152 (Wayne Au & Joseph J.
Ferrare eds., 2015).
52. See Motoko Rich, A Walmart Fortune, Spreading Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/us/a-walmart-fortune-spreading-char
ter-schools.html; L. S. Hall, Take a Look at the Biggest Winners of Walton Ed Money in
2013, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.insidephilanthropy.comIhome/20
14/4/3/take-a-look-at-the-biggest-winners-of-walton-ed-money-in-201.html; Karla Scoon
Reid, After Divisive Start, Use of 'Parent Trigger' Law Matures, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/03/18/after-divisive-start-use-of-parent-trigger.
html.
53. See Maia Bloomfield Cucchiara, Cities Are Trying to Fix Their Schools by Luring
the Middle Class: It Won't Work, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.
con/education/archive/2013/10/cities-are-trying-to-fix-their-schools -by-luring-the- middle-
class-it-wont-work/280390/.
54. See John Caskey & Mark Kuperberg, The Philadelphia School District's Ongoing
Financial Crisis, 14 EDUC. NEXT 21, 21, 23-24, 26 (2014), http://educationnext.org/files/ed
nextXIV_4_caskey.pdf.
55. See Jacques Steinberg, In Largest Schools Takeover, State Will Run Philadelph-
ia's, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2001), http://www.nytimes.comI200l/l2/22/us/in-largest-schools-
takeover-state-will-run-philadelphia-s.html.
56. See Lori Olszewski & Stephanie Banchero, Vallas to Take over Philadelphia
Schools, CHI. TRIB. (July 10, 2002), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-07-10/news/02
07100049_lpaul-vallas-philadelphia-schools-chicago-public-schools.
57. See News Release, Sch. Dist. of Phila., School District of Philadelphia Launches





appointed by the governor and two commissioners appointed by
the mayor.8 Vallas, the first CEO hired by the newly formed
SRC, emphasized an approach to education reform already in
place in Philadelphia known as the "diverse provider model" or
the "contracting regime."59 This model entailed expanding charter
schools and opportunities for school choice, while contracting out
key services in the District at unprecedented levels. As Associate
Professor of Urban Education Maia Bloomfield Cucchiara ex-
plains, "[u]nder Vallas and the SRC, the school district moved to-
ward the creation of educational markets in the city. Charter
schools-once resisted by the district as a drain on its resources-
were embraced.""° After her appointment in 2008 as Vallas's suc-
cessor, Arlene Ackerman continued to expand charter schools,
consistent with Race to the Top and the flexibility afforded under
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in the form of
NCLB waivers, by turning over chronically low-performing
schools to charter providers.6 Between 2010 and 2014, twenty
district-run schools had been converted or restarted as "Renais-
,,62sance Charters.
A. The Boston Consulting Group
In 2012, in the face of mounting deficits and under the watch of
an interim Superintendent, the SRC quietly contracted with a
private consulting firm, the Boston Consulting Group ("BCG"), to
58. See Eva Travers, Philadelphia School Reform: Historical Roots and Reflections on
the 2002-2003 School Year Under State Takeover, 2 PENN GSE PERSP. ON URB. EDUC., Fall
2003, http://www.urbanedjournal.org/archive/volume-2-issue-2-fall-2003/philadelphia-scho
ol-reform-historical-roots-and-reflections-2002-; Who Runs the School District of Philadel-
phia?, EDUC. VOTERS PA., http://educationvoterspa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10Who-
Runs-the-School-District-of-Philadelphia.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
59. See Katrina E. Bulkley, Bringing the Private into the Public: Changing the Rules
of the Game and New Regime Politics in Philadelphia Public Education, 21 EDUC. POLy
155, 173-79 (2007).
60. MAIA BLOOMFIELD CUCCHIARA, MARKETING SCHOOLS MARKETING CITIES: WHO
WINS AND WHO LOSES WHEN SCHOOLS BECOME URBAN AMENITIES 53 (2013).
61. See Benjamin Herold, Renaissance Schools to Expand, PHILA. PUB. SCH.
NOTEBOOK: BENJAMIN HEROLD'S BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://thenotebook.orgblog
/124390/renaissance-schools-expand?page=l; Dale Mezzacappa, Special Report: Philadel-
phia After Decades of Effort, a Decade of Progress, WASH. MONTHLY (2010), http://www.
washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1007.mezzacappa.html; see also supra notes 5-7
and accompanying text (discussing the granting of NCLB waivers and Race to the Top).
62. See Kati Stratos et al., Philadelphia's Renaissance Schools Initiative after Four
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advise the District on restructuring its finances to prevent an im-
pending financial collapse." The William Penn Foundation
("WPF'), whose President Jeremy Nowak praised the involve-
ment of the BCG as "a defining moment for our schools," original-
ly approved funding for the five-week contract with the BCG to-
taling $1.4 million. 4 Yet in the end, the BCG was actually paid a
total of $4.4 million through private donations, the majority of
which came from the WPF.65 Specifically, Nowak proclaimed that
by helping to identify methods of securing additional funds for
the classroom, the use of the BCG served as a necessary step to
help reduce the disconcerting achievement gaps in the District."
However, the BCG recommendations appeared to be in stark
contrast to Nowak's hopes for the District's improvement plans.
Instead of focusing on addressing the educational needs of under-
served youth, the BCG identified strategies such as the closure of
up to sixty Philadelphia schools, reductions in unionized school
personnel, and new contracts with private vendors at a discount-
ed cost.67 In addition to school closures and staff cuts, the BCG al-
so supported charter school expansion, despite having conducted
a citywide analysis that indicated charter schools were not
demonstrating significantly higher performance levels than pub-
lic schools in the PSD.6
Notwithstanding the fact that these recommendations would
have tremendous impact on the students, parents, and staff, as
well as the surrounding school communities, the BCG operated
behind the scenes. In formulating its recommendations, it did not
solicit input from any of the key stakeholders and ultimately the
BCG plan called for the closure of "40-50 schools in the near-
63. Benjamin Herold, Foundation to Pay for District Consultant, PHILA. PUB. SCH.
NOTEBOOK: BENJAMIN HEROLD'S BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012, 4:45 PM), http://thenotebook.org
blog/124543/foundation-pay-district-consultant.
64. Id.
65. Dale Mezzacappa & Benjamin Herold, Report Detailing Boston Consulting Group
Findings and Recommendations Released, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK: DALE
MEZZACAPPA'S BLOG (Aug. 2, 2012, 6:35 AM), http://thenotebook.orglblog/125045/report-
detailing-boston-consulting-group% E2%80%99s-findings-and-recommendations-released-
distric.
66. See Herold, supra note 63.
67. See Benjamin Herold, Behind the Scenes, Boston Consulting Group Has Been a
Driving Force on Labor Talks, School Closings, and Charters, PHILA. PUB. SCH.






term" and "an additional 15 to 20 schools over the next five
years."69 The SRC had already voted to close eight neighborhood
schools in 2012, but with a new superintendent at the helm who
started a month after the BCG report was released, PSD moved
swiftly to take up more of the BCG's recommendations." In 2013,
after Superintendent William Hite's initial plans to close thirty-
seven schools were met with significant community outcry,"' the
SRC voted to approve the closure of twenty-three schools, displac-
ing an additional 14,000 students.
2
B. The Promises
1. "Safer, Stronger Schools"
A major criterion for potential school closure involves academic
performance as measured by students' standardized test scores
over time.73 Champions of school closures and public-to-charter
school conversions often argue that the closure of under-
performing schools will afford students increased access to high-
er-performing schools.4
The BCG explained that "[olne of the goals of the planning pro-
cess [of closing schools] should be to move students into better
learning environments."5 The BCG said that following its rec-
ommended approach of right-sizing would lead to "[i]ncrease[d]
69. Damon C. Williams, School Closure Study Draws Lawsuit, PHILA. TRIB. (Dec. 7,
2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.phillytrib.com/news/school-closure-study-draws-lawsuit/artic
le_4cebc6a3-686d-5c62-b671-b6099ca32864.html.
70. School Reform Commission Approves 8 Schools for Closure, NBC 10 PHILA. (Mar.
29, 2012, 8:41 PM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.conmnews/local/School-Reform-Commiss
ion-Approves-8- Schools-for-Closure- 144998335.html.
71. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, Community Loses: The Costs of Education Reform, 45
TOL. L. REV. 579, 584-85 (2014).
72. See Benjamin Herold, School Reform Commission Votes to Close 23 Philadelphia
Schools, Sparking Anger and Despair for Students, Parents, and Teachers, NEwSWORKS
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/item/52008-school-reform-com
mission-votes-to-close-23-philadelphia-schools.
73. See THE BROAD FOUND., supra note 48, at 15-16; Dale Mezzacappa, District
Shares the Rationale Behind Each School-Closing Recommendation, PHILA. PUB. SCM.
NOTEBOOK: DALE MEZZACAPPA'S BLOG (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:47 AM), http://thenotebook.org/
blog/135514/district-shares-rationale-behind-each-school-closing-recommendation; Gail L.
Sunderman & Alexander Payne, Does Closing Schools Cause Educational Harm? A Review
of the Research, MID-ATLANTIC EQUITY CTR. (Dec. 2009), http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED543514.
74. See Sunderman & Payne, supra note 73.
75. THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., TRANSFORMING PHILADELPHIA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2012).
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overall academic performance of the portfolio. As low-quality
buildings and programs are closed, lower-performing seats would
be eliminated, strong programs would be preserved in better-
quality buildings, and students would be reassigned to programs
that provide better academic options."76
In a December 2012 email to PSD personnel in which he first
announced his intentions to shutter thirty-seven schools, Super-
intendent William Hite echoed the BCG's promises:
[W]e must achieve two objectives: improve learning opportunities for
all our students and overcome massive financial challenges. We are,
as you know, facing tough times that require even tougher choices.
On Thursday afternoon, I will release a plan detailing the steps that
must be taken to put us on the road towards long-term academic
success and financial stability. It is a plan that focuses on better
harnessing our resources to provide safer, stronger schools for all our
families. This will involve consolidating programs, expanding efforts
to turn around chronically low-performing schools, and closing agingS . 77
school buildings.
Even after revising the Facilities Master Plan so that twenty-
nine, rather than thirty-seven, schools would be recommended for
closure, Hite continued to voice his belief that closing schools
would improve opportunities for displaced students: "Although I
wish we could have avoided closing any school, I do believe that
the amended recommendations address the concerns from many
parents, students and residents. I hope that we can move forward
in minimizing disruption for our students and providing better
options for families."" The implication in this last phrase is that
the receiving school would be "better" academically than the
closed schools.
2. Expected Financial Gains from Building Sales
School districts experiencing financial crises often expect to
find relief by closing schools, looking to the resulting profits from
shuttering and/or consolidating public schools to ease their finan-
76. Id. at 32-33.
77. Paul Socolar, Philly School-Closing List Released by Superintendent, NEWSWORKS
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/the-latest48303-hite-releases-
school-closing-plan.
78. Paul Socolar, District Reduces Number of Planned School Closings from 37 to 29,




cial burden.79 As evidenced in Hite's statement above, closing
schools was seen as a key strategy in achieving the long-term fi-
nancial stability and health of the District. Upon taking office in
the summer of 2012, Hite's first action plan explained that
[t]he District has recurring expenses that exceed its revenues by
over $250 million per year, amounting to a $1.35 billion dollar deficit
over the next five years. (It is important to note that the budget cri-
sis can quickly become a cash crisis if the structural deficit is not ad-
dressed in time for the 2013-2014 budget.) This deficit was created
by a confluence of factors-reduced state funding, a broken system of
local tax assessment, charter-driven growth in the total public school
population without new revenue ....
Facing a staggering projected deficit and a strict mandate to
balance its budget, PSD officials turned to school closures as a
means of "rightsizing" the District."1 District leaders framed
school closure as a necessary, albeit painful, way to generate
much needed revenue and rein in costs.
82
PSD's 2012-13 Budget in Brief Book notes that "the SRC re-
cently voted to close several school buildings, which will ultimate-
ly result in savings due to lower operating costs and new reve-
nues due to the sale of the properties."8 The budget projected
earnings in 2012-13 of $10,898,000 from the sale of shuttered
schools.4 Meanwhile, as additional schools closed the following
year and new budgets were forecast, the 2013-14 budget book
79. PA. CLEARINGHOUSE FOR EDUC. RESEARCH, RESEARCH FOR ACTION, ISSUE BRIEF:
SCHOOL CLOSINGS POLICY 1-2, 4 (2013), http://www.researchforaction.org/wp-contentup
loads/2013/03/RFA-PACER-School-Closing-Policy-Brief-March-2013.pdf.
80. THE SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., ACTION PLAN v1.0, at 7 (2013), http://www.philasd.org/
announcements/actionplanAPvl.0.pdf (containing a preface written by Superintendent
William Hite); see also Our Leadership, THE SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., http://www.phila.k12.
pa.us/leadership/ (last updated Oct. 26, 2015) (explaining Dr. Hite's professional experi-
ence before being named Superintendent on June 29, 2012).
81. THE ScH. DIST. OF PHILA., FACILITIES MASTER PLAN, http://webgui.phila.k12.pa.us
/uploads/hl/yA/hlyARgKq-w6-_yeDQ-mVpw/FMPOne.pdf; see also Motoko Rich & Jon
Hurdle, Rational Decisions and Heartbreak on School Closings, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/education/rational-decisions-and-heartbreak-on-
school-closings.html?_r=0.
82. See Press Release, The Sch. Dist. of Phila., School Reform Commission Approves
Facilities Master Plan Recommendations (Mar. 7, 2013), https://webapps.philasd.org/news
/display/articlesl1458; see also Natalye Paquin et al., Pain for Gain in School Plan,
PHILLY.COM (Jan. 16, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-01-16/news/36355406-1-list-of-
school-closures-fewer-students-empty-classrooms.
83. THE SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., FY 2012-13 BUDGET IN BRIEF 13 (2012), http://webgui.
phila.kl2.pa.us/uploads/iJ/as/iJasxwamd3nLIsSAZlSpIQ/SDP-FY2012-13-Budget-in-Brief
-2012-4-24. pdf.
84. See id. at 33.
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projected that the sale of property would generate $10,000,000
that year, with $14,503,000 realized in the 2012-13 school year,
even though Hite had imposed a two-year moratorium on further
school closures for 2013-14 and 2014-15.85 The 2014-15 budget
was perhaps the most optimistic, in which "anticipated building
sales and city funding [were] projected to yield approximately
$61.4 million in revenues.86
3. Expected Cost Savings
In addition to generating revenues, school closures are ex-
pected to yield significant annual cost savings, as "stranded
costs"-that is, the costs that cannot be reduced when a student
leaves a district-run school for a charter school, taking his share
of per-pupil dollars with him-can be shed.87 The BCG calculated
projected savings associated with closing forty to fifty schools at
$32 million to $40 million annually, with expected savings of
$800,000 per school building.8 PSD's projections for costs savings
in 2013 were estimated at $28 million for the closure of thirty-
seven schools.8 As the number of planned school closures de-
creased, these estimated savings were later revised downwards
by PSD officials, first to $24.5 million a year," and then later to
$21 million annually in the 2014-15 budget book.9' Notably, the
$21 million estimate works out to $875,000 saved per school per
85. THE SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., FY 2013-14 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 17, 19 (2013), http:
//webgui.phila.k12.pa.us/uploads/lzlYy/lzYyyftrnPP96eMfLE8XQ/FY2013-14-Consolidat
ed-Budget.pdf; see Solomon Leach, Philly Schools Chief No School Closings Recommended
for This Year, PHILLY.COM (Jan. 10, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-O1-1O/news/460
69610_l philly-schools-chief-school-closings-hite; Trenae V. McDuffie, Hite Addresses City
Council's Moratorium Resolution at MLK Public Meeting, NEWSWORKS (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/iteml50093-mlk-school-closings-meeting-jan-24.
86. THE SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., FY 2014-15 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 17 (2014), http://
webgui.phila.k12.pa.usuploadsd-Gh/d-GhySH9C5EF4TBqOW7XKwFY201415-Consolid
ated-Budget.pdf.
87. See Tom Ferrick, Ending the Hypocrisy on Charters, 6 INDEP. VOICE 4 (2014), http:
//www.germantownnewspapers.com/Welcome-toGermantownNewspapersjfiles/TV.050
114.all.pdf.
88. THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 75, at 31.
89. See Bill Hangley, Jr., Closure Savings Are Labor Savings, PHILA. PUB. SCH.
NOTEBOOK (Feb. 4, 2013, 2:21 PM), http://thenotebook.org/february-2013/135574/closure-
savings-are-labor-savings.
90. See Socolar, supra note 78.
91. See FY 2014-15 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET, supra note 86, at 24.
[Vol. 50:809
NEOLIBERAL EDUCATION REFORM
year, which is a higher average than that anticipated in the BCG
report.
92
The BCG argued that of the $800,000 per school building the
district could expect to save from closure, "[r]oughly 45-50 per-
cent of those savings [would come] from the consolidation of ad-
ministrative and instructional staff that is possible with consoli-
dating school programs; the remaining 50-55 percent of those
savings results from the elimination of direct facilities and build-
ing support expenses, such as maintenance and utilities."93 None-
theless, in-depth analyses of documents reporting on PSD's ex-
pected savings from school closures revealed that the majority of
the savings were expected to come from staff cuts." Indeed, only
20% of the savings were expected to come from cutting costs asso-
ciated with building maintenance, utility fees, and leases, while
80% of the savings would come from workforce reductions.5 The
District projected saving $9.2 million from maintenance staff re-
ductions, $8.7 million from reduced operations (administrative
staff), $3.7 million from cuts in teaching staff, a half million from
reductions in school health operations (i.e., school nurses), and
about a quarter million from reductions in security staff.9" Of
course, the savings achieved from avoiding costly repairs or up-
grades to old buildings are difficult to calculate, but PSD un-
doubtedly hoped to avoid significant cash outlay to modernize
many of the buildings it selected to close.
C. The Reality
1. Transitioning Students to Less Safe, Similarly Performing
Schools
While closures hope to provide students access to better quality
education, research demonstrates that such an outcome does not
always occur. For instance, one quantitative study from Chicago
found that a staggering 82% of students were transferred to
schools on probation or in the lowest quartile of performance on
the Iowa Test of Basic Skills, while only 6% of students were
92. See THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 75, at 9.
93. Id. at 31.
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transferred to high-performing schools.97 A study in Colorado in-
dicated that students displaced by school closure showed declines
on standardized tests and had a lower probability of graduating
and a higher probability of dropping out than they would have
had they continued at their shuttered school.9" Furthermore, re-
search shows that when schools close, parents do not always en-
roll their children in higher-performing alternatives, even when
they are available, favoring instead such factors as close proximi-
ty to home and perceived safety.99
Drawing on data from the Philadelphia School District web-
site'° and the Pennsylvania Department of Education website,
specifically the School Performance Profiles' and the School Pro-
gress Reports,"2 we analyzed differences in student achievement
results between high schools that were closed at the end of the
2012-13 school year and those that became receiving schools at
the start of the 2013-14 school year. We defined receiving schools
as those which received fifty or more students, as that is the cut-
off point used by the District in its analyses. This process identi-
fied nine receiver high schools for the eight high schools that were
closed.
Independent sample t-tests revealed that no statistically signif-
icant differences existed between the closed schools and the re-
ceiving schools in 2013 average student outcomes according to the
School Progress Reports. The two groups of schools had identical
average rates of first-time Keystone Exam passing in Math
(5.3%). Though the receiving schools performed better in terms of
first-time Literature Keystone passing rates than the closed
schools (18% versus 10%), this difference was not statistically
significant.
97. See MARISA DE LA TORRE & JULIA GWYNNE, WHEN SCHOOLS CLOSE: EFFECTS ON
DISPLACED STUDENTS IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (2009).
98. See Ben Kirshner, Matthew Gaertner & Kristen Pozzoboni, Tracing Transitions:
The Effect of High School Closure on Displaced Students, 32 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLY
ANALYSIS 407, 415 (2010).
99. MARISA DE LA TORRE ET AL., SCHOOL CLOSINGS IN CHICAGO: UNDERSTANDING
FAMILIES' CHOICES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR NEW SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 3 (2015).
100. THE SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., http://www.phila.kl2.pa.us (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
101. PA. DEP'T OF EDUC., Pennsylvania School Performance Profile, http://paschoolperf
ormance.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
102. THE SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., School Progress Report (SPR), http://webgui.phila.kl2.




These findings of no statistically meaningful differences be-
tween the two groups of schools continued to hold when we com-
pared student outcomes in receiving schools in 2014 to those of
students from schools closed in 2013. Again, one year later, the
receiving schools performed neither better nor worse, statistically
speaking, than the closed schools did in 2013 with respect to rates
of Keystone passing. And when compared to their own perfor-
mance a year earlier, receiving schools suffered a significant de-
cline in literature passing rates (down by 4% on average), while
algebra passing rates remained stagnant.
Other analyses showed that receiving schools in Philadelphia
were more dangerous than closed schools, both the year before
the closure announcement and the year following the closure pro-
cess, with significantly greater numbers of serious incidents of vi-
olence in the year following closure.'°1 Therefore, the data suggest
that at the high school level, Hite's vision of creating "safer,
stronger schools" through a process of consolidation, turn-around,
and closure has yet to be achieved.
2. Lower Than Expected Revenues
While school districts often estimate that schools will sell for
anywhere from $500,000 to upwards of $15,000,000, the average
sale prices in many cities range from $200,000 to $1,000,000, fall-
ing well below projected estimates.0 4 Philadelphia is no exception
to this trend, consistently selling properties for considerably less
than the asking price, most notably among listings labeled as "not
hot properties ' due to the dilapidated conditions of the building,
urban decay of surrounding area, and lack of interested buyers
103. Jerusha Conner & Katherine Cosner, School Closure as Structural Violence and
Stakeholder Resistance as Social Justice, 24 J. FOR PEACE & JUST. STUD. 27, 42 (2014).
104. See PHILA. RESEARCH INITIATIVE, PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PHILADELPHIA AND
OTHER BIG CITIES STRUGGLE TO FIND USES FOR CLOSED SCHOOLS (2013), http://www.pew
trusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/201302/1 1/philadelphia-and-other-big-cities-
struggle-to-find-uses-for-closed-schools; ee also Dylan Scott, Repurposing Schools Gives
Life to Vacant Buildings, GOVERNING (May 7, 2012), http://www.governing.com/news/lo
callgov-repurposing-schools-offers-new-life-to-vacant-buildings.html (describing the Kan-
sas City, Missouri School District's expectation to receive $15 million per property for
closed schools, and the Tulsa School District's expectation to receive millions of dollars per
property for its recently closed schools).
105. SRC Votes on Sale of Three Properties, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK: THE
NOTEBOOK'S BLOG (Nov. 15, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://thenotebook.orgblog/125337/src-con
sider-sale-three-properties.
2016]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
for large school properties not conducive to repurposing.I°6 For ex-
ample, Elizabeth Gillespie Middle School, closed in 2009, sold to
Mastery Charter Schools in 2015 for $250,000, despite an asking
price of $1,500,000.17 In a particularly egregious example, in
2013, the district sold an Education Services Building on Monroe
Street that was listed at $1,200,000 for $1.00, or one hundred
pennies, to Queen Village Lofts LP.0°
We drew on public records to determine the actual revenues,
savings, and costs associated with the closure of thirty schools in
Philadelphia between 2012 and 2013. These records included
Philadelphia County property records and school district budgets,
newspaper reports, press releases, and direct correspondence
with various individuals, including PSD's Director of Real Proper-
ty Management, the Real Property Management Specialist, and
realtors who are identified as the contacts for listed school prop-
erties. However, it is important to note at the outset that several
gaps and inconsistencies in the data remain. We have made every
attempt to clarify and reconcile these gaps and inconsistencies
through direct correspondence with officials. However, the chal-
lenge of discerning accurate data underscores the recurring lack
of transparency within the PSD and an ongoing recalcitrance not
only to include the community in decision-making processes, but
also to report results to the public in a timely fashion.
Of the thirty schools that closed during 2012 and 2013, the Dis-
trict has managed to sell half at the time of this writing. Five
buildings are still on the market, with a combined total asking
price of $6.15 million. Nine buildings have been "repurposed" by
the District, while one building sits vacant and unlisted as the
106. See Benjamin Herold, KIPP Backs out of Deal to Buy Vacant Philadelphia School,
PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK: THE NOTEBOOK'S BLOG (Mar. 22, 2013, 2:27 PM), http:
//thenotebook.orgfblog/135787/kipp-backs-out-deal-buy-vacant-philadelphia-school.
107. Watch Tonight's SRC Meeting, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK: THE NOTEBOOK'S
BLOG (Oct. 16, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://thenotebook.orgfblog/147828/previewing-src-meeting.
108. See Benjamin Herold, District Sets $6.5 Million Sale Price for Old West Philly
High Building, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK: BENJAMIN HEROLD'S BLOG (Feb. 14, 2012,
6:34 PM), http://thenotebook.org/blog/124530/district-lists-old-west-philly-high-building-
sale-65m; Property, 427-37 Monroe St., CITY PHILA., https://alpha.phila.gov/property/?p=8
81003350 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
109. See Kevin McCorry, Philly School District Set to Sell Six of Its Recently Shuttered
Buildings, NEWSWORKS (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/loca/educa
tion/65330-philly-school-district-set-to-sell-four-of-its-recently-shuttered-buildings; Dale
Mezzacappa, SRC Approves Building Sales, Ratifies Principals' Contract, PHILA. PUB.




District waits to determine what to do with it. The repurposed
schools have been reinvented in such ways as a K-8 school, an
early childhood learning center, and three new "innovative" high
schools. Though the costs of repurposing remain unclear, the
three new innovative high schools, which were largely funded by
private grants, were estimated to cost PSD an additional $2.5 to
$3 million."' In short, of the thirty closed schools, one-third will
not be generating revenue through sales, and any cost savings
anticipated from their closure will not be realized by the District.
Of the fifteen schools that were sold, six were sold outright,
while the remainder were sold as "package deals" in groups of
three or more. The city estimated one of these packages consist-
ing of four schools to be worth $24,357,800; however, the group
was sold for just $3 million."1 Another group consisting of five
schools sold for $6.8 million, though the asking price was nearly
twice as much at $12.15 million, and the value estimate was
$30,782,800.12 A reporter commenting on the discrepancies be-
tween the estimated values of the closed buildings, the asking
prices, and the final sales prices described the District as selling
schools at "bargain-basement prices.""' 3 He explained, "the quasi-
public agency that handled the sales on the School District's be-
half, sold the 11 school buildings for less than 19 percent of what
the city says they're worth, even as the School District is strug-
gling to close a multimillion-dollar budget deficit.""' 4 Meanwhile,
though the sale of these eleven buildings resulted in $14.2 mil-
lion, the district only netted $2 million after adjusting for closing
costs and other factors. '5 The data we collected show that sales
for the buildings closed in 2013, which includes the sale of four
additional school buildings closed in earlier years, have amounted
to $45.75 million before closing costs and other expenses are ac-
110. See Dale Mezzacappa, SRC Approves Creation of Three Small, Innovative High
Schools, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK: DALE MEZZACAPPA's BLOG (Feb. 21, 2014, 11:27
PM), http://thenotebook.org/blogl146958/src-approves-creation-three-new-small-innovative
-high-schools.
111. See Solomon Jones, SRC Sells Schools for Pennies When the District Needs Mil-
lions, NEWSWORKS (Sept. 22, 2014), http:/lwww.newsworks.org/index.php/locallthe-phila
delphia-experimenti73024-schools-sold-for-pennies-when-the-district- needs-millions.
112. See id.; Aaron Moselle, SRC Approves Germantown High School Sale to Md. De-
velopers, NEWSWORKS (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.newsworks.org/index.phpllocajnw-phil
adelphia/72950-src-approves-germantown-high-school-to-md-developers.
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counted for. Even without these adjustments, the profit is well
short of the $61 million anticipated in the 2014-15 budget book.116
Furthermore, the budget books from 2014-15 and from 2015-16
show that actual revenues from the sale of property in the years
2012-13 and 2013-14 have only netted $30,304,274 in revenues,
a quarter of which was directed towards debt services rather than
the general fund.117 These budgets projected zero dollars in reve-
nue from the sales of property in 2014-15 and 2015-16,118 sug-
gesting that at best the district has achieved half of what it had
hoped from the sales of property since 2012.
3. Additional Costs of Closure
Although the District sold eleven schools within one year of
their closing and an additional four the following year, the
maintenance of shuttered schools that sit on the market is esti-
mated to cost the district approximately $5000 a month per build-
ing.119 This means that since their closure in 2013, the five schools
currently on the market could have cost the District approximate-
ly $700,000. This figure includes neither the upkeep costs associ-
ated with the schools that sold after several months on the mar-
ket, nor the costs associated with the surplus properties that are
still on the market from earlier rounds of closure or decommis-
sioning. For example, three properties currently listed for sale on
the Philadelphia School Sales website have long sat vacant. Ru-
dolph Walton Elementary School has been unused since 2003,120
the Beeber-Wynnfield Annex since 2004,12" and the Old Frances
116. FY 2014-15 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET, supra note 86, at 17.
117. Id. at 42 (indicating actual revenue from sales of property in 2012-13 totaled
$343,500, all of which was directed towards the debt services fund); THE SCH. DIST. OF
PHILA., FY 2015-16 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 93 (2015), http://webgui.phila.kl2.pa.us/up
loads/ZH/2fIZH2fOGACmEKyUR3mwTKHXASDPBookWeb v4.pdf (indicating actual
revenue from the sale of property in 2013-14 totaled $29,960,774, $7,379,271 of which was
directed towards the debt services fund, rather than the general fund).
118. See FY 2014-15 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET, supra note 86, at 42; FY 2015-16
CONSOLIDATED BUDGET, supra note 117, at 93.
119. JESSE BLITZSTEIN ET AL., UNIV. OF PA. SCH. OF DESIGN, NEW LIFE FOR OLD
SCHOOLS 25 (2013), http://issuu.com/pennpraxis/docs/new-life for-old-schoolsfinal-rep
ort_2013.
120. See Available School District of Philadelphia Properties, PHLScHOOLSALES.COM,
http://www.phlschoolsales.com/#properties (last visited Feb. 19, 2016); Herold, supra note
106.
121. See Available School District of Philadelphia Properties, supra note 120; Benjamin
Herold, After Schools Are Closed, Who Decides Their Fate?, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK
(June 2, 2011, 2:43 PM), http://thenotebook.org/june-2011/113763/after-schools-are-closed-
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Willard School since 2010.22 Thus, it is clear that maintaining
these vacant properties for such long periods is not without costs.
In many cases, shuttered schools may be purposely kept off the
market for later reuse, a process referred to as "mothballing.'
1 23
Maintaining these schools can be costly for the District, but ne-
glecting them and allowing them to fall into total disrepair im-
poses significant costs on the surrounding community, as aban-
doned buildings become sites for squatters, substance abuse,
crime, and vandalism.24 Shuttered schools also contribute to ur-
ban blight, serving as a constant reminder of abandonment, di-
vestment, and decline to the community members.25
In addition to the difficulty of selling shuttered schools and the
costs of maintaining vacant properties, there are significant tran-
sition costs associated with school closures that impact the bot-
tom line financial projections. These costs are not always made
transparent in district calculations, and they are not always pro-
jected accurately. For instance, an auditor's report published in
2012 found that Washington, D.C., incurred upwards of $40 mil-
lion in transition costs, which were four times the original esti-
mates.'26 Similarly, leaked documents from Chicago revealed that
the school district underreported the transition costs from esti-
mates of $150 million to $400 million.'27 While a full report detail-
ing the total transition costs for Philadelphia in the wake of the
closure of twenty-four schools and the displacement of 14,000
students has yet to be disseminated,'28 it remains evident that the
who-decides-their-fates.
122. See Available School District of Philadelphia Properties, supra note 120; Kate
Hartman & Ben Griffiths, Plan Philly: Vacant School Buildings Affect Surrounding Com-
munities, PHILA. NEIGHBORHOODS (Dec. 6, 2012), http://philadelphianeighborhoods.com/
2012/12/06/plan-philly-vacant-school-buildings-impact-surrounding-communities/.
123. See Courtney Lauren Anderson, The Disparate Impact of Shuttered Schools, 23 J.
GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 319, 330 n.76 (2015).
124. See Hartman & Griffiths, supra note 122.
125. Rachel Hildebrandt, City Controller's Plan to Demo Schools Short-Sighted and
Uninformed, HIDDENCITY PHILA. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://hiddencityphila.org/2011/12/va
cant-schools-as-assets/.
126. Hangley, Jr., supra note 89.
127. Id.
128. See Laura Benshoff, Philadelphia District Nets $42 Million from Selling Former
Schools, NEWSWORKS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/loca/educati
on/79035-philadelphia-district-nets-42-million-from-selling-former-schools; Wendy Harris,
Concerns Still Abound as District Nears School Closings, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK
(May 22, 2013, 1:57 PM), http://thenotebook.org/summer-2013/136023/concerns-still-abou
nd-district-nears-school-closings.
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District was expected to incur significant transition costs, with
reported expenses at $25.6 million after defeasance of bonds and
closing costs.'29 The District acknowledged the potential magni-
tude of these transition costs in its 2012-13 Budget in Brief Book,
stating that
moving teachers and students out of a building, assessing the build-
ing for sale, and actually going through the sales process require[s]
time-nearly a year in most cases. This means that the full savings
from the closure of the buildings will not be realized until a year or
more after the original closure 
vote.1
3 °
However, it stopped short of specifying a projected figure. Assum-
ing the accuracy of the estimate in the BCG report of "one-time
costs projected at approximately $70,000 per school, including
costs to decommission the school and move equipment,"'31 the
thirty school closures in 2012 and 2013 cost PSD around
$2,100,000.132 In summary, transition costs, the costs of maintain-
ing shuttered buildings while prospective buyers are sought, and
closing costs quickly add up, reducing projected savings marked-
ly.
D. Who Buys Closed Schools'Buildings?
A study by the Pew Charitable Trusts of twelve cities in which
school closure strategies have been used found that the main pur-
chaser of shuttered schools is charter management organiza-
tions.3 3 In fact, slightly more than 40% of the properties sold, re-
purposed, or leased in these cities went to charter providers.' In
Chicago, charter schools bought so many of the shuttered schools,
propelling further enrollment shifts from district-run schools to
these new charters, that the city adopted a policy of no longer
selling its closed buildings to charter providers.35
In Philadelphia, despite superficial attempts to involve key
stakeholders in final decisions, the SRC retains ultimate execu-
129. See Benshoff, supra note 128; McCorry, supra note 109.
130. FY 2012-13 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 83, at 13.
131. THE BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 75, at 31.
132. James Jack & John Sludden, School Closings in Philadelphia, 10 PENN GSE
PERSP. ON URB. EDUC., Summer 2013, http://www.urbanedjournal.org/archive/volume-10-
issue- 1-summer-2013/school-closings-philadelphia.





tive control over who buys each school and for how much.3 ' To
hasten the sale of shuttered schools and help ensure the buildings
are repurposed for educational uses, many districts in major cit-
ies, including Philadelphia, have enacted formal reuse policies
giving first priority to charter schools and other non-profit buyers
to bid on properties.137 Of the six schools that were sold outright
between 2012-13, four were sold to charter schools, one was sold
to a developer, and one was sold to the Archdiocese of Philadelph-
ia."'8 The three other purchasers of the remaining properties,
which were sold in package deals, include the Philadelphia Hous-
ing Authority, Drexel University, and the development company
Concordia.3 '
1. Perpetuating the Financial Crisis
Given that two of the main reasons for school closures are fi-
nancial debt and low student enrollment, it is difficult to under-
stand how allowing more charter schools to open, with each new
charter school student costing the District approximately $7000140
is expected to reverse the current financial crisis in Philadelphia.
Additionally, a student transferring from a private school to char-
ter schools is estimated to cost the District approximately
$10,000.41 With the ongoing expansion of charter schools, families
136. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., SHUTTERED PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE STRUGGLE TO BRING
OLD BUILDINGS NEW LIFE 3, 11 (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/medialasse
ts/2013/02/1 1/philadelphia schoolclosings report.pdf? la=en.
137. Id. at 8 ("Laws in Ohio, Georgia and the District of Columbia require districts to
let charter operators bid on a closed school before anyone else."); see also ADVISORY COMM.
FOR SCH. REPURPOSING AND CMTY. DEV., REPORT (Feb. 2014), http://www.cityofchicago.org/
content/dam/city/depts/mayor[Press%20Room/Press%2OReleases/2014/January/02.07.14
CPSREPORT.pdf (discussing plan for repurposing closed schools in Chicago); KCPS Re-
purposing Initiative, KAN. CITY PUB. SCHS., http://www.kcpublicschools.org/repurposing
(last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (explaining reuse program in Kansas City); Vacant Schools in
Philadelphia a Cautionary Tale for Chicago, WBEZ (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.wbez.org
/news/vacant-schools-philadelphia-cautionary-tale-chicago-105570 (highlighting Philadel-
phia's formal reuse policy).
138. See, e.g., Laura Benshoff, supra note 128; Kristen A. Graham & Tony Graham,
School District Has Deals to Sell Several Schools, PHILLY.COM (Feb. 28, 2014), http://arti
cles.philly.com/2014-02-28/news/477440601_building-sales-philadelphia-school-district-al
exander-wilson-elementary; Martha Woodall, Out of Nowhere a Network Emerged to Save
Catholic Schools, PHILLY.COM (June 24, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-06-24/news
/50801065 1 independence-mission-schools-al-cavalli-network.
139. Benshoff, supra note 128; Graham & Graham, supra note 138; Jones, supra note
111.
140. Hangley, Jr., supra note 89.
141. Joseph A. Dworetzky, Analyzing the Role of Charter School Funding in the Dis-
trict's Budget Problems, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK: THE NOTEBOOK'S BLOG (Sept. 19,
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are increasingly turning to charters as an affordable alternative
to public and parochial schools."' Yet, the District remains finan-
cially accountable for all students attending charter schools, re-
gardless of their original school prior to their transfer.1 4 3 In addi-
tion to its fiscal responsibility for students attending brick and
mortar charter schools, the District is also responsible for funding
students attending cyber charter schools, which are projected to
increase enrollment numbers from 5900 in fiscal year 2013 to
10,750 in fiscal year 2017.'" Overall, in the 2015 fiscal year, the
cost of financing students to attend charter schools is estimated
at approximately $755.6 million and is projected to increase the
following year to nearly $800 million.145
Recognizing the significant costs of charter expansion to the
District, the SRC has made several attempts to cap the enroll-
ment numbers for charter schools in Philadelphia, hoping to miti-
gate the rate of expansion.'46 However, these attempts have been
futile, as rejected charter applicants have successfully gone above
the district level, appealing to the state charter authorizing body,
which has found in favor of the charter schools in judicial hear-
ings, thus preventing PSD from its prudent attempts to limit en-
rollment of charter schools.147
2. Perpetuating Community Disenfranchisement
The proliferation of charter schools in the District has political,
as well as financial, consequences. As co-director of the Urban
2013, 3:19 PM), http://thenotebook.orgblog/136459/analyzing-role-charter-school-funding-
districts-budget-problems.
142. See Jon Marcus, The Demise of Private Schools, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/09/parochial-schools-demise/403369/.
143. See Dworetzky, supra note 141 (demonstrating how the District must pay for stu-
dents transferring from public, parochial, and independent schools).
144. See Damon C. Williams, School District Files Five-Year Plan, PHILA. TRIB. (Sept.
13, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.phillytrib.com/newstschool-district-files-five-year-plan/ar
ticleof77f755-6670-5d86-9566-7d6f391a3lbe.html.
145. See FY 2015-16 CONSOLIDATED BUDGET, supra note 116, at 77.
146. See Dale Mezzacappa, State Has Paid Millions to Charter Schools Since SRC Sus-
pended the Code, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK: DALE MEZZACAPPA'S BLOG (Dec. 13, 2013,
5:11 PM), http://thenotebook.org/blog/136750/state-has-paid-millions-charter-schools-src-
suspended-code.
147. See Dale Mezzacappa, Commonwealth Court Rules District Can't Force Charters to





Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania Elaine Simon
contends:
[E]lected and policy officials-with business elites at every level
leading behind the scenes-plan to replace these [shuttered] public
schools with charter schools. But charter schools deflect responsibil-
ity and accountability by fragmenting the system, shattering it into
too many pieces for the public to keep track of. They are not the
city's responsibility. Their performance is not as transparent, and
they do not have to take all students.148
Indeed, there have been several concerns raised regarding the
lack of transparency among the charter schools . Many of these
concerns eventually led to the discovery of a multitude of serious
infractions in Philadelphia and several other states including, but
not limited to, personal embezzlement of funds, charges for "ghost
students" (i.e., students who intended to enroll but never did),
and use of school funds to support other charter businesses.15 De-
spite these scandals, the state continues to hold the District re-
sponsible for funding charter schools, while the issue of lack of
transparency remains clear.5'
In addition, notwithstanding attempts made by the SRC to cur-
tail the expansion of charter schools in Philadelphia, there is a
notable enmeshment between the SRC and charter providers,
which compromises the integrity of district dealings and further
erodes public trust in the SRC. For example, SRC member Farah
Jimenez has abstained from several, but not all, votes on policies
that would directly impact charter schools ostensibly because her
husband is employed by a law firm that regularly defends a num-
ber of charter companies, including Mastery and KIPP, both of
which have a strong and growing presence in Philadelphia."'
148. Elaine Simon, Are School Closings the New Urban Renewal?, PHILA. PUB. SCH.
NOTEBOOK: THE NOTEBOOK'S BLOG (Mar. 4, 2013, 6:37 PM), http://thenotebook.orgblog/
135696/school-closings-new-urban-renewal.
149. See Valerie Strauss, A Dozen Problems with Charter Schools, WASH. POST (May
20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheetlwp/2014/05/20/a-dozen-pro
blems-with-charter-schools/.
150. See CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY & ALL. TO RECLAIM OUR SCHS., THE TIP OF THE
ICEBERG CHARTER SCHOOL VULNERABILITIES To WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE 9 (Apr. 27,
2015), http://populardemocracy.org/sites/defaultifiles/Charter-Schools-National-Report-rev
2.pdf; see also Public Schools Starve as Charter Schools Get Funded for "Ghost Students,"
SAVE OUR SCHS. NZ (Oct. 22, 2015), http://saveourschoolsnz.com/2015/10/22/public-scho
ols-starve-as-charter-schools-get-funded-for-ghost-students-nzei.
151. See DeJarnatt, supra note 71, at 592-96.
152. See Regina Medina, Advocacy Group to Gov. Wolf Get Rid of SRC Member,
PHILLY.COM (Oct. 15, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-10-15/news/67417807-lfarah-
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In summary, our analysis of school closings in Philadelphia
adds to the growing literature that exposes fundamental flaws in
the logic of school closure. First, displacing students and sending
them to schools with similar or worse track records of safety and
achievement does not help students to access better educational
opportunities. Furthermore, when these disruptions and mergers
are accompanied by significant reductions in teachers, adminis-
trators, and support staff, as was the case in Philadelphia, and
are compounded by further budget cuts that eliminate after-
school programs, art and music classes, and many basic school
supplies, students quickly receive the message that society sees
their education, as well as their futures, as expendable. This mes-
sage imposes psychological costs that are difficult to quantify.
However, it is clear that the overcrowded and under-resourced
conditions that both displaced and receiver students now experi-
ence are far from educationally ideal.
Second, even those costs that can be calculated and weighed
alongside projected savings and revenues suggest that school clo-
sure is not necessarily better for the books. PSD has yet to
achieve fiscal stability or health, and with more charter schools
opening on the sites of former district-run schools, it is unlikely to
be able to do so anytime soon. After closing twenty-four schools in
2013, PSD faced such massive budget shortfalls that it was forced
to pass a "doomsday budget" for 2013-14 and an "empty shell"
budget the following year.13 Superintendent Hite decried both
budgets as woefully insufficient.14 Although PSD has sold several
shuttered properties, it has racked up many expenses associated
with closure that have eaten into those profits."5 Furthermore,
jimenez-charter-schools-office-discussions.
153. See Ken Derstine, The 2013-14 "Doomsday Budget"of the School District of Phila-
delphia: How Did It Come to This?, DEFEND PUB. EDUC.! (June 3, 2013), http://www.de
fendpubliceducation.net/psd-doomsday-budget/; Kevin McCorry, Beyond 'Doomsday. Phil-
adelphia School District Unveils Its 'Empty Shell' Budget, NEWSWORKS (Apr. 26, 2014),
http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/the-latest/67322-beyond-doomsday-philadelph
ia-school-district-unveils-its-empty-shell-budget; Saying Goodbye to 24 Philadelphia
Schools, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK (Sept. 20, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://thenotebook.org/
october-2013/136420/saying-goodbye-24-philadelphia-schools.
154. See Press Release, Sch. Dist. of Phila., Statements from Superintendent Hite and
SRC Chairman Green on Delayed Adoption of FY2015 Budget (May 29, 2014), https://
webapps.philasd.org/news/display/articles/2156.
155. See BLITSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119 (stating that operating costs of permanently
closed schools can run as high as $5000 per building); Benshoff, supra note 128 (noting
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the total amassed from the sales of former school buildings still
falls far short of the $61 million projected for fiscal year 2015. 6
Indeed, actual revenues from the sale of property fell $1.4 million
short of the District's estimates in 2012-13 and $31.4 million
short in 2013-14.157
Third, school closure renders holes in the very fabric of civic
life. It erodes communities by divesting them of a key public insti-
tution, a site that binds generations and instills a sense of com-
munity pride and identity. ' s Closure processes also undermine
community trust in the education system by further disenfran-
chising affected stakeholders, who feel their voices are neither
heard nor respected.5 ' This lack of trust can propel the cycle of
divestment, as more parents leave the public system for private
charter schools, leading to more enrollment shifts, more underuti-
lized district-run schools, greater financial strain on the District,
and the resulting need for more school closures."° This neoliberal
encroachment threatens not just to dismantle public education,
but to compromise one of the basic building blocks of United
States democracy.
It has become commonplace for proponents of school choice to
describe students in struggling district-run schools as
"trapped."'' Such imagery effectively sets up the neoliberal solu-
tion of school choice. Students who are trapped should be freed to
choose schools in the educational marketplace. That way, the
onus falls on them to select "good" schools and make their own
lives better, and not on society to ensure that all children have
the opportunities they deserve.
that associate expenses have eaten into the profits gained from the sales of school build-
ings).
156. See Benshoff, supra note 128.
157. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
158. See Simon, supra note 148.
159. See, e.g., Clarece Polke, Parents Feel Voices Unheard in Wilkinsburg-Pittsburg
Partnership, PIT1SBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 23, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gaze
tte.com/news/education/2015/10/23/Parents-feel-voices-unheard-in-Wilksburg-partnership
/stories/201510230151.
160. See NAT'L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PUBLIC CHARTER
SCHOOLS & STUDENTS, 2014-2015 (2015) (discussing the increase in charter school en-
rollment and reasons for school closings); Simon, supra note 148.
161. See Kate Casas, St. Louis Students Still Trapped in a Failing School District, ST.
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If instead of seeing students as trapped by the system we saw
them as shunned by society, as betrayed by a government willing
to turn its back on them and simply "outsource" the problem they
represent, then we might begin to recognize our own complicity in
this situation. Only then might we be capable of generating the
collective capacity necessary to create the political will to invest
in the students who attend district-run neighborhood schools and
to reclaim our nation's long-held commitment to public schooling.
The students in public neighborhood schools have dreams-
dreams of becoming productive, contributing members of society,
citizens, and change agents-dreams that for many years our so-
ciety has sabotaged by neglecting, starving, threatening, punish-
ing the schools they attend, and then throwing up our hands and
asking why they are not improving. It is time to realize that if we
truly want different outcomes, we need different inputs. It is time
to rework our calculus so that we see that it is the costs of derail-
ing the hopes and dreams of our youth-not the costs of improv-
ing their schools-that are truly unsupportable for the long-term
health and well-being of our economy and our democratic society.
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